State-of-the-Art Survey on In-Vehicle Network Communication CAN-Bus Security and Vulnerabilities

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Nowadays with the help of advanced technology, modern vehicles are not only made up of mechanical devices but also consist of highly complex electronic devices and connections to the outside world. There are around 70 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicle which are communicating with each other over the standard communication protocol known as Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus) that provides the communication rate up to 1Mbps. There are different types of in-vehicle network protocol and bus system namely Controlled Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnected Network (LIN), Media Oriented System Transport (MOST), and FlexRay. Even though CAN-Bus is considered as de-facto standard for in-vehicle network communication, it inherently lacks the fundamental security features by design like message authentication. This security limitation has paved the way for adversaries to penetrate into the vehicle network and do malicious activities which can pose a dangerous situation for both driver and passengers. In particular, nowadays vehicular networks are not only closed systems, but also they are open to different external interfaces namely Bluetooth, GPS, to the outside world. Therefore, it creates new opportunities for attackers to remotely take full control of the vehicle. The objective of this research is to survey the current limitations of CAN-Bus protocol in terms of secure communication and different solutions that researchers in the society of automotive have provided to overcome the CAN-Bus limitation on different layers.

Published In : IJCAT Journal Volume 4, Issue 11

Date of Publication : November 2017

Pages : 78-85

Figures :05

Tables : 01

Publication Link :State-of-the-Art Survey on In-Vehicle Network Communication “CAN-Bus” Security and Vulnerabilities

Omid Avatefipour : is currently pursuing his Master’s program in Computer Engineering at University of Michigan-Dearborn. His research interests include in-vehicle network communication protocol security, Embedded Systems, Data mining, Intelligent Control systems and Robotics. He has work experience at Vector CANTech company as Embedded Software Engineer and at Valeo North Amercia company as System Software Engineering in Advanced Engineering Research & Development department. He has also worked as researcher in Information System, Security, and Forensics (ISSF) laboratory at Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE), University of Michigan – Dearborn. Additionally, he was working as primary researcher in the laboratory of Control and Robotics at institute of Advanced Science and Technology, IRAN SSP Research & Development center.

Hafiz Malik : is Associate Processor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) Department at University of Michigan – Dearborn. His research in cybersecurity, multimedia forensics, information security, wireless sensor networks, steganography/steganalysis, pattern recognition, information fusion, and biometric security is funded by the National Academies, National Science Foundation and other agencies. He has published more than 70 papers in leading journals, conferences, and workshops. He is serving as Associate Editor for the IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security since August 2014 and for the Springer Journal of Signal, Image, and Video Processing (SIVP) May 2013 – present. He is also on the Review Board Committee of IEEE Technical Committee on Multimedia Communications (MMTC). He organized Special Track on Doctoral Dissertation in Multimedia, in the 6th IEEE International Symposium on Multimedia (ISM) 2006. He is also organizing a special session on “Data Mining in Industrial Applications” within the IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (IEEE SSCI) 2013. He is serving as vice chair of IEEE SEM, Chapter 16 since 2011. He is also serving on several technical program committees, including the IEEE AVSS, ICME ICIP, MINES, ISPA, CCNC, ICASSP, and ICC. He is a senior IEEE member.

CAN-Bus protocol, CAN-Bus Vulnerabilities, In-vehicle Network Communication, CAN-Bus Security

In this study, in-vehicle network communication protocol CAN-Bus and its corresponding vulnerabilities are introduced. Several researchers have performed to show its corresponding weaknesses in terms of penetrations to the network. Although some researchers proposed security solutions for the current protocol, most of the work in this area are carried out to introduce the current problems and their solutions are not comprehensive. Developing security solution in physical layer security would have more merits compared to transfer layer because one of the challenges for developing security mechanism in the transfer layer (applying message authentication code) is the limitation of computational power and memory of the microcontrollers which could be insufficient to develop a cryptographic algorithm for CAN-Bus in real-time environment.

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